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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the first military commission proceedings began in July 
2004, the Bush Administration identified fifteen Guantanamo Bay 
detainees subject to the military commissions.1  Subsequently, Bush 
Administration officials asserted that they had evidence to move 
forward with between sixty and eighty cases within the commission 
  
    *  Devon Chaffee is Advocacy Counsel for Human Rights First’s Law and Se-
curity Program.  As such, she has served as an observer to several military com-
mission proceedings at Guantanamo Bay. 
 1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Presidential Military Order Applied to 
Nine More Combatants (July 7, 2004), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.as 
px?releaseid=7525. 
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system.2  But, by the time President George W. Bush left office in 
early 2009, the commissions had resolved only three cases.3   
Upon taking office, President Barack Obama initially suspended 
the military commission proceedings in the thirteen cases in which 
charges were pending, but, in May 2009, he announced his intention 
to move forward with some commission trials at Guantanamo Bay.4  
In January 2009, the Obama Administration’s Guantanamo Review 
Task Force reported that it had identified thirty-six cases slated for 
prosecution.5  On November 13, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder 
announced that the government would pursue civilian court prosecu-
tions of the five defendants accused of conspiring to commit the 9/11 
attacks and military commissions for five other detainees.6  Over a 
year later, military commissions have resolved only three additional 
cases, all resulting in plea deals, and there have been only sporadic 
proceedings in any pending cases.7   
  
 2. News Transcript, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD Press Briefing on New Military 
Commissions Rules (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/tran 
script.aspx?transcriptid=3868; see Catherine Herridge, White House Puts Military 
Commissions on Hold, Source Says, FOX NEWS (Nov. 25, 2010), 
www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/25/white-house-puts-military-commissions-
hold-source-says/ (noting that the chief prosecutor in the military commissions 
was actively prepping for fifty to sixty commissions as of 2010).  
 3.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Convicted of Terrorism 
Charge at Military Commission Trial (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/ 
Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=12329; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., De-
tainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Military Commission Trial (Aug. 6, 
2008),  http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid =12118; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Guanta-
namo Trial (Mar. 30, 2007),  http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx? 
ReleaseID=10678. 
 4. See Joseph Williams, Obama Keeps Tribunals, Draws Ire, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 16, 2009, at A1. 
 5. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 9–10 (2010).  
 6. Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ 
ag-speech-091113.html (statement of Eric Holder).  
 7.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD Announces Sentence for Detai-
nee Noor Uthman Muhammed (Feb. 18, 2011) http://www.defense.gov/releases/ 
release.aspx?releaseid=14278;  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military Com-
mission Guilty Plea (July 7, 2010) http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx? 
releaseid=13684; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Details of Omar Khadr Plea 
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In the nine years since their inception, the military commissions 
at Guantanamo Bay have confronted resistance on appeal, multiple 
overhauls, and persistent criticism from the international and nation-
al security communities.  Seven military commission prosecutors 
have resigned or requested transfers from their posts due to concerns 
that the commissions’ process was not fair.8  More recently, past 
supporters of the system have become increasingly skeptical of its 
viability going forward.  In September 2010, Jack Goldsmith, who 
served as U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel under Attorney General John Ashcroft from October 2003 
to July 2004, called on the Obama Administration to abandon the 
use of military commissions, which he described as “a good idea in 
theory but have for nine years proved unworkable in practice.”9  
  
Agreement Released (Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.a 
spx?releaseid=14024.  
 8. The seven military commission prosecutors who either resigned or requested 
transfers are: Lt. Col. Stuart Couch, Col. Morris Davis, Col. Fred Borch, 
Maj. Robert Preston, Capt. John Carr, Capt. Carrie Wolf, and Lt. Col. Darrel Van-
develd.  See Dan Ephron, Gitmo Grievances: Assigned to Try Detainees in the 
War on Terror, Three Former Guantánamo Prosecutors Now Say the Military-
Commission System Is Badly Damaged, NEWSWEEK (May 17, 2008), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/05/17/gitmo-grievances.html; William Glaber-
son, Guantanamo Prosecutor Is Quitting in Dispute Over a Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2008, at A20; Guantanamo Prosecutor Steps Down, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
25, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7635028.stm; Josh Meyer, For 
Lawyer, Trial was Tribulation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at 1; Josh Meyer, 
Guantanamo Prosecutor Quits, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at 19; Ed Palattella & 
Lisa Thompson, Millcreek Man vs. the U.S.: Unique Connections Between Guan-
tanamo Bay and Erie, ERIE TIMES-NEWS (Sept. 27, 2008),  
http://www.goerie.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080927/NEWS02/30927992
7; Carol Rosenberg, Army Prosecutor Quits Gitmo War Court Case, MIAMI 
HERALD (Sept. 25, 2008), http://freedetainees.org/2245; Leigh Sales, Leaked 
Emails Claim Guantanamo Trials Rigged, ABC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2005), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200508/s1426797.htm; Leigh Sales, Third 
Prosecutor Critical of Guantanamo Trials, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 3, 2005), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200508/s1428749.htm; Elana Schor, War 
Crimes Charges Dropped Against Five Guantánamo Detainees, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
21, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/21/guantanamo-usa.  
 9. Jack Goldsmith, Editorial, A Way Past the Terrorist Detention Gridlock, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2010, at A25. 
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After months of news reports that the Administration had put the 
brakes on the Defense Department’s use of military commissions,10 
the New York Times reported in January 2011 that Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates is preparing to open the doors for new cases.11  The 
harried track record of the commissions suggests, however, that the 
simple lifting of a self-imposed ban will do little to address the inhe-
rent flaws that have caused the system to flounder for nearly a dec-
ade.  
This article examines some of the key shortcomings of the mili-
tary commissions that can be expected to beleaguer new cases going 
forward.12  I do not attempt to recreate the comprehensive legal criti-
ques produced by others elsewhere13 but instead focus on three spe-
cific areas of concern: the lack of established judicial precedent, the 
opaqueness of the proceedings and rulemaking process, and the ab-
sence of a principled distinction between the cases to be sent to mili-
tary commissions and those to be tried in regular federal courts.  
These three weaknesses have persisted through—and, in some ways, 
have been exacerbated by—the numerous revisions to the laws and 
regulations governing the military commissions.  They are also like-
ly to continue to undermine the commissions’ credibility and effica-
cy despite efforts to remedy other procedural and substantive inade-
quacies.  
II.  CREATING A SYSTEM FROM SCRATCH . . . THREE TIMES  
The lack of existing legal precedent to direct the commissions’ 
interpretation of governing laws and procedures has proven a perpe-
  
 10. See, e.g., Editorial, Obama’s Detainee Mess, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2010, at 
A16.  
 11. Charlie Savage, U.S. Prepares to Lift Ban on Guantánamo Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A1. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., David W. Glazier, A Court Without Jurisdiction: A Critical As-
sessment of the Military Commission Charges Against Omar Khadr 5–7 (Loyola 
Law Sch., L.A., Working Paper No. 2010-37, 2010); David W. Glazier, Still a Bad 
Idea: Military Commissions Under the Obama Administration 65–67 (Loyola Law 
Sch., L.A., Working Paper No. 2010-32, 2010) [hereinafter Glazier, Still a Bad 
Idea]. 
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tual and intractable stumbling block, which has plagued the military 
commissions consistently since their inception.14  The Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2009 incorporated some additional 
rules from the civilian justice system and the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) and even states that UCMJ precedent may be 
instructive.15  However, civilian court precedent remains inapplica-
ble to the commissions,16  and the MCA of 2009 explicitly states that 
the judicial construction and application of the UCMJ is nonbind-
ing.17  Divorcing the commissions from such existing bodies of 
precedent has forced judges and attorneys to confront novel legal 
and procedural issues of first impression at every turn.  This lack of 
precedent has resulted in a disturbing uncertainty surrounding the 
state of applicable law and has created extensive delays, with strik-
ing implications for individual cases.18 
From the military commissions’ earliest proceedings, it was clear 
that devising an entirely new system of criminal justice would pose 
serious difficulties.  During the first commission hearings in July 
2004, it became apparent that the system would be mired in persis-
tent wrangling over rudimentary issues, such as appropriate legal 
representation, how to handle cases where the defendants refused to 
participate in proceedings, and the scope of the commissions’ per-
sonal jurisdiction.19   
Another example of an unresolved issue of first impression arose 
during the December 2008 pre-trial proceedings of the five 9/11 de-
  
 14. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 
Stat. 2574, 2575 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2006)); 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2602 (2006) (amended 2009). 
 15. § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2575. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.   
 18. See, e.g., Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi, HUM. RTS. FIRST, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/military-
commissions/cases/ibrahim-ahmed-mahmoud-al-qosi (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).  
Al Qosi was taken into custody in 2001 and charges were first filed in 2004.  Id.  
His case took over six years to resolve.  Id. 
 19. See Aug. 26: A Defendant Asks to Represent Himself, HUM. RTS. FIRST BLOG 
(Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2004/08/26/aug-26-a-defendant-
asks-to-represents-himself. 
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fendants, when the defendants indicated their intention to plead 
guilty.20  When Khalid Sheik Mohammed asked Judge Colonel Ste-
phen Henley—“[i]f we plead guilty, can we still be sentenced to 
death?”—Judge Henley responded that the answer to this question, 
though well-settled in both the regular federal courts and under the 
UCMJ, was not clear under military commission law.21  The judge 
then asked counsel to submit briefs on the issue.22  Later that month, 
the case against the 9/11 defendants continued and eventually the 
charges were withdrawn.23  Currently, the question remains unre-
solved and unaddressed by the subsequently enacted MCA of 
2009.24  
At the appellate level, the Court of Military Commissions Re-
view (CMCR),25 a newly created court of review,26 has encountered 
its own obstacles.  The CMCR has yet to rule on a post-trial appeal, 
even though it heard arguments in the cases, United States v. Ham-
dan and United States v. Al-Bahlul, over a year ago.27  Such delays at 
  
 20. See Jennifer Daskal, Chaos in the 9/11 Courtroom, SALON (Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2008/12/11/guantanamo. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Charge Sheet for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE (Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mohamed 
%20al%20Kahtani%20Dismissed%20Charges%209%20May%202008%20R.pdf 
(showing crossed-out charge sheets). 
 24. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 
Stat. 2574–2614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, & 28 
U.S.C.). 
 25. United States Court of Military Commission Review (USCMCR), U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/courtofmilitarycommissionreview.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
 26. See § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2603 (§ 950f). 
 27. See Robert Chesney, The Court of Military Commission Review Finally Be-
gins to Move on the Hamdan and Al-Bahlul Appeals, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 24, 
2011, 4:46 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/01/the-court-of-military-
commission-review-finally-begins-to-move-on-the-hamdan-and-al-bahlul-
appeals/; Robert Chesney, Undue Delay at the CMCR re the Viability of Material 
Support and Conspiracy Charges and the Ability to Raise Constitutional Argu-
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the CMCR level exacerbate the lack of clarity in the state of the law 
at the commission level.28  
The continual legislative and regulatory overhaul of the military 
commissions has compounded the obstacles caused by the system’s 
lack of established precedent.  The underlying military commissions’ 
legal authority has been revamped three times over the past nine 
years: first with President Bush’s 2001 military order; second, in 
2006, with the first MCA; and, third, in 2009, with the passage of the 
second MCA.29  Each new iteration has required the Department of 
Defense to issue new rules and regulations for implementation while 
the commissions pushed forward with proceedings before any appli-
cable regulations were issued.30  With each revamp of the relevant 
law and regulations, the commissions have returned to square one in 
answering questions of first impression, interpreting the new law, 
and implementing rules.  As recently as January 2011, the New York 
Times reported that, yet again, new regulations for conducting mili-
tary commissions were circulating among Administration officials.31  
Thus, after nearly nine years of the commissions’ existence, there 
continues to be no body of military commission precedent.  In future 
cases, the commissions will be faced with revisiting previously liti-
  
arguments-in-commission-proceedings (discussing the undue delays in the Ham-
dan and Al-Bahlul appeals with the CMCR). 
 28. See Michelle Lindo McCluer, Tuesday’s Two Cents’ Worth: CMCR Delays, 
NAT’L INST. OF MIL. JUST. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2011, 7:32 AM),  
http://www.nimjblog.org/2011/01/tuesdays-two-cents-worth-cmcr-delays.html 
(discussing various issues with the CMCR delays).  
 29. See 123 Stat. at 2574; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, & 
28 U.S.C.); Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833–36 (Nov. 13, 2001); see also Ruling on 
Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination, or, Alternatively, Dismissal 
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, United States v. al Qosi, No. D-023 (Military 
Comm’n Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/D-
023%20Ruling-Article%205%20(3Dec09)%20Al%20Qosi%20(Redacted).pdf 
[hereinafter al Qosi] (illustrating the confusion in applying the various legal au-
thorities). 
 30. See Andrea Prasow, Guantanamo Military Commissions Stymied Again, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-
prasow/guantanamo-military-commi_b_535823.html. 
 31. Savage, supra note 11, at A1. 
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gated legal issues under the 2009 law, the new 2010 Manual for Mil-
itary Commissions, and any further regulatory changes promulgated 
by the Department of Defense.  
The commissions’ attempt to determine the individuals over 
whom they have jurisdiction is an instructive example of the difficul-
ties resulting from the lack of precedent and the fluctuation in appli-
cable laws.  After the passage of the MCA of 2006, Military Judge 
Peter Browback dismissed the charges against Omar Khadr, and 
Judge Keith Allred dismissed charges against Salim Hamdan, be-
cause, although both Khadr and Hamdan had been designated as 
“enemy combatants,” they had not been designated as “unlawful 
enemy combatants,” as required by the MCA of 2006.32  This issue 
took three months to resolve, with the CMCR issuing its first-ever 
decision on September 24, 2007, holding that the commission judges 
were, themselves, authorized to make “unlawful enemy combatant” 
determinations.33  The military judges then had to schedule and hold 
hearings to determine the status of the defendants as “unlawful ene-
my combatants.”34  The MCA of 2009 altered, yet again, the com-
missions’ scope of personal jurisdiction to cover a newly defined 
category of “unprivileged enemy belligerents.”35  This amendment 
left the commission judges with the task of reassessing and reinter-
preting the scope of the commissions’ personal jurisdiction under the 
new law, an issue that could very well be appealed again to the 
CMCR.36    
  
 32. Decision and Order: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, United 
States v. Hamdan (June 4, 2007), in 1 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 
MILITARY COMMISSION REPORTER, 6–9 (2009); Order on Jurisdiction, United 
States v. Khadr (June 4, 2007), in 1 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MILITARY 
COMMISSION REPORTER 152–54 (2009).  
 33. United States v. Khadr, No. 07-001, slip. op. at 20–21 (CMCR Sept. 24, 
2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2007/KHADR%20 Deci-
sion%20(24%20Sep%2007)(25%20pages).pdf. 
 34. See Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination, United 
States v. Hamdan, (Military Comm’n Dec. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Dec2007/HAMDAN%20ARTICLE%205%20RULI
NG%2017%20Dec%202007.pdf. 
 35. Compare § 3, 120 Stat. at 2602 (§ 948b(a)), with § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2575 
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2006)). 
 36. See, e.g., al Qosi, supra note 29. 
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The continuous reinvention of the commissions has created ex-
tensive delays in the context of specific cases, where individual de-
fendants have encountered rules in a nearly constant state of flux.  
Ihrahm Ahmed Mohmoud al Qosi, for instance, was originally 
charged in 2004 and his case dragged on for over five years, through 
all three iterations of the military commission system.37  In the 
course of those five years, the prosecution filed, withdrew, and re-
filed numerous charge sheets under the different versions of the mili-
tary commission law.38  In December 2009, when the prosecution 
moved, again, to amend the charge sheet against al Qosi in response 
to the amendments made by the MCA of 2009, Military Judge Lt. 
Colonel Nancy Paul, noted that, after five years in the military com-
mission system, the defense did not “even know what the charges are 
going to look like.”39  Judge Paul made this comment in the midst of 
presiding over military commission proceedings that lacked applica-
ble commission rules—the MCA of 2006 had been passed, but the 
regulations implementing the legislation had not been issued.40  
While al Qosi eventually pled guilty in October 2010, even his plea 
deal failed to go smoothly because the government reportedly agreed 
to conditions of confinement that, post-plea, it realized it was unable 
to fulfill.41  Given the long history of delay in al Qosi’s case—the 
first case to be resolved in the military commissions under the Ob-
  
 37. See United States v. Ibrahim al Qosi, No. P-002 (Military Comm’n May 22, 
2009) (Defense Response to Government Motion for Appropriation Relief (120 
Day Continuance)), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/P-
002%20Ruling%20and%20Pleadings%20on%20Mot%20for%20cont%20Redac4a
ug.pdf (“[H]e has been charged under three phases of the Guantanamo debacle, 
without resolution of his case.”).   
 38. See id. (discussing various charges brought against the defendant at various 
times).  
 39. Devon Chaffee, Try, Try and Try Again: The Military Commissions That 
Couldn’t, HUM. RTS. FIRST BLOG (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
2009/12/03/try-try-and-try-again-the-military-commissions-that-couldnt. 
 40. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, UNITED STATES (2010) 
[hereinafter MMC 2010] (issued on April 27, 2010, several months after the 2009 
al Qosi hearing). 
 41. Plea Deal Pledge Unfulfilled for Gitmo Detainee, SIFY NEWS (Oct. 13, 
2010), http://www.sify.com/news/plea-deal-pledge-unfulfilled-for-gitmo-detainee-
news-others-kknplcbdebf.html. 
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ama Administration42—it can hardly be heralded as a success for 
justice that will build credibility for the military commission system.  
During proceedings in December 2008, Military Judge Colonel 
Ralph Kohlmann referred to the commissions’ process as “a learning 
experience.”  Both defense attorneys and former prosecutors have 
described this comment as a disturbing characterization for any sys-
tem of criminal justice, especially one adjudicating capital cases.43  
Moreover, after more than nine years, there is little evidence that the 
commissions are any closer to overcoming the obstacles inherent in 
creating a new legal system entirely devoid of legal precedent.44   
III.  LACK OF TRANSPARENCY  
In addition to problems stemming from the dearth of precedent, 
the military commissions have been shrouded by a persistent opa-
queness, creating a veil between the commission system and the 
public and undermining the commissions’ credibility.  This lack of 
transparency is particularly evidenced by the restricted public access 
to commission proceedings, the failure to make commission docu-
ments publicly available in a timely manner, and the failure to en-
gage in a public comment process prior to the promulgation of regu-
lations governing the commissions. 
As a general matter, trials in civilian, federal courts as well as 
courts-martial are open to the public.45  Open trials are widely rec-
  
 42. Mike Melia, Gitmo Detainee to Avoid Solitary in Plea Deal, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2010/ 
08/09/gitmo_detainee_to_avoid_solitary_in_plea_deal. 
 43. Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 60 (2009) (statement of Denny LeBoeuf, 
Director, John Adams Project, American Civil Liberties Union); Lt. Col. Darrel 
Vandeveld & Joshua Dratel, Military Commissions: A Bad Idea, SALON (Mar. 10, 
2010), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2010/03/10/terrorism_trial.  
 44. See Richard V. Meyer, When a Rose Is Not a Rose: Military Commissions v. 
Courts-Martial, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 48, 48–49 (2007) (comparing certain as-
pects and procedures of military commissions with courts-martial).  
 45. See Katherine Flanagan-Hyde, Note, The Public’s Right of Access to the 
Military Tribunals and Trials of Enemy Combatants, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 585, 600 
(2006). 
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ognized as benefiting both the public and the defendant by allowing 
the public to serve as a check on the judicial process, assuring the 
public that the trials are being conducted fairly and providing the 
public with an outlet for outrage in response to criminal acts.46  
The military commission proceedings are ostensibly open.47  But 
observation of the commission proceedings is severely limited be-
cause of the remoteness of, and restricted access to, Guantanamo 
Bay.  The commission proceedings are not, as a practical matter, 
open to the general public; only credentialed media, select represent-
atives from organizations with observer-status, and select victim rep-
resentatives have been permitted to observe the proceedings.48  In 
2004, after the Department of Defense initially announced that hu-
man rights and civil liberties organizations would not be permitted to 
observe the military commissions,49 the Department of Defense 
granted a limited number of these groups observer-status.50  Yet, 
access to the commissions, including for alleged victims and the 
general public, remains limited to a select number of observers.51 
The media has continuously complained about restrictions at 
Guantanamo Bay that interfere with its ability to report on the mili-
tary commission proceedings, including restricted access to defense 
counsel and relevant documents, insufficient access to media facili-
  
 46. Randolph N. Jonakait, Secret Testimony and Public Trials in New York, 42 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 407, 409–410 (1998); see also Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. 
Noone, The Military Commissions—A Possible Strength Giving Way to a Proba-
ble Weakness—and the Required Fix, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 523, 526 (2004) 
(discussing the transparency of courts-martial).  
 47. See Neil A. Lewis, Rights Groups Won’t Get Seats at Guantánamo Base 
Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A14 (discussing lack of space for human 
rights advocacy groups during the Guantanamo military commissions).  
 48. See MMC 2010, supra note 40, at II-73 R. 806; MANUAL FOR MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS, UNITED STATES, at II-68 R. 806 (2007) [hereinafter MMC 2007]. 
 49. See Lewis, supra note 47, at A14. 
 50. Preface to 2 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, NIMJ REPORTS FROM 
GUANTÁNAMO (2010) (describing how, after lengthy delay, NIMJ was given alter-
native observer-status); Letter from American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty 
International USA, Human Rights First, & Human Rights Watch to President Ob-
ama (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/App5.pdf (discussing how 
the organizations were granted observer-status in 2004). 
 51. See MMC 2010, supra note 40, at II-73 R. 806; MMC 2007, supra note 48, at 
II-68 R. 806. 
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ties, and overzealous photography prohibitions.52  In 2010, the mili-
tary banned four reporters from observing the proceedings because 
they had released the name of a witness whose identity was already 
known to the public.53  The reporters were eventually reinstated.54  
Moreover, the time-consuming logistical requirements of traveling to 
and from Guantanamo Bay prevent even those news outlets autho-
rized to observe the commissions from attending the various pro-
ceedings on a consistent basis.55 
Beyond physical access to the hearings, public access to other 
timely information pertinent to the case records is far from adequate.  
While some of the orders, motions, and charge sheets are accessible 
from the military commissions’ website,56 the list of included docu-
ments is far from comprehensive, the documents generally appear 
after significant delays, and many of the older documents are omit-
ted altogether.57  Observers at Guantanamo Bay struggle to obtain 
electronic or hard copies of unclassified opinions or rulings from the 
commissions and are usually only able to do so long after the rele-
vant commission proceedings have concluded.58  Additionally, there 
  
 52. Roy Gutman, Reporters Complain They Can’t Get Guantanamo Court 
Records, MCCLATCHY (July 29, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/ 
29/98348/do-guantanamo-media-restrictions.html; Pentagon Issues New Rules for 
Guantanamo Coverage, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://en.rsf.org/etats-unis-pentagon-issues-new-rules-for-13-09-2010,38347.html. 
 53. Jeremy W. Peters, Pentagon Ends Guantanamo Reporters’ Ban, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2010, at A11.  
 54. Id. 
 55. See Jeremy W. Peters, News Media Seek Loosening of the Pentagon’s Rules 
at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A13 (addressing inconveniences 
faced by the media at Guantanamo); Alkaps, Jonathan Hafetz of the Brennan Ctr 
Discusses Getting There, YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=sP1AzMtr9q0. 
 56. See Military Commissions, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/ 
news/commissions.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
 57. For example, charges were first filed against Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al 
Qosi in 2004, but the documents on the U.S. Department of Defense website for 
this case only date back to 2008.  Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsQosi.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2011).    
 58. See, e.g., Letter from Eugene Fidell, President, Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice, 
to Honorable Nancy Paul, Chief U.S. Bankr. Judge, Dist. of Minn. (Dec. 3, 2009) 
(requesting a copy of an unclassified opinion from the court) (on file with author). 
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is no system that provides access to court dockets, relevant unclassi-
fied briefs, or other records of relevant case activity outside of the 
courtroom, even though access to such information is critical to un-
derstanding the progress of any criminal case.59  
Beyond the issue of public access to the military commission 
proceedings and related documents, the lack of transparency is also 
evident in the process by which the government has established rules 
governing the military commissions.  Allowing for notice and com-
ment is intended to foster public confidence in the rulemaking 
process and to ensure that the relevant agency benefits from the in-
put of various stakeholders and experts in the field.60  Yet, the De-
partment of Defense has repeatedly failed to use established rule-
making and notice-and-comment procedures in developing commis-
sion rules, despite the fact that the government follows such proce-
dures when promulgating new rules for federal courts and courts-
martial.61   
In 2003, the Administration did informally release a draft Mili-
tary Commissions Instruction, setting out the elements of crimes to 
be tried by military commissions.62  While outside experts and inter-
est groups submitted a number of comments in response to the draft, 
the Department of Defense did not release any detailed response to 
the comments.63  On April 3, 2003, the Department of Defense 
  
 59. The National Institute of Military Justice has taken it upon itself to publish 
volumes of military commission documents to which it was able to gain access.  
See Military Commission Case Documents, NAT’L INST. OF MIL. JUST., 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/military_commission.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 
2011) (providing links to compiled military commission documents).   
 60. Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions & Administrative Law, 6 GREEN 
BAG 2d 379, 382 (2003). 
 61. Eugene R. Fidell, Limitations of the Military Commissions Structure, 
ACSBLOG (June 25, 2010, 12:17 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/ 
node/16423; Jonathan Tracy, The Sad Saga Continues in Guantanamo Bay, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-
tracy/the-sad-saga-continues-in_b_559080.html. 
 62. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DRAFT MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION (2003), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2003/d20030228dmci.pdf. 
 63. See News Transcript, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Background Briefing on the Re-
lease of Military Commission Instructions (May 2, 2003) 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2563.  A Depart-
ment of Defense official explained that this draft instruction had been released for 
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promulgated the instruction on the elements of crimes along with 
seven other instructions, for which no opportunity for public com-
ment had been granted.64  The Department of Defense ignored prior 
calls for a public notice-and-comment period prior to issuing the 
Manual for Military Commissions implementing the MCA of 2006, 
as well as prior to issuing the Manual for Military Commissions im-
plementing the MCA of 2009.65  The National Institute of Military 
Justice has actively sought to obtain additional documentation re-
garding whom the Department of Defense has consulted in promul-
gating the commission rules, but its efforts—including a lawsuit un-
der the Freedom of Information Act—have been unsuccessful.66 
In the regular federal courts, access to courtroom proceedings are 
generally open to the public, and briefs, motions, opinions, and asso-
ciated documents can, for the most part, be freely accessed through 
electronic databases.  Furthermore, the public is given an opportuni-
ty to submit comments before rules are finalized.67  This consistent 
  
comment.  Id.  The official further explained that the Department of Defense had 
“received quite a number of comments, very useful comments, from various offi-
cials, from other governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private groups 
and individuals in and outside of government,” but the official provided no specif-
ics as to how these comments were incorporated into the final rule.  Id.  
 64. See id. (Department of Defense official explaining that the seven additional 
military commission instructions to be released had not been released to the public 
in draft form). 
 65. See Eugene R. Fidell, Preface to 1 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 
MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK, at v (2003) (requesting the 
Department of Defense to use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures); David 
Frakt, New Manual for Military Commissions Disregards the Commander-in-
Chief, Congressional Intent and the Laws of War, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-
c_b_557720.html; Human Rights First, Public Participation and the 2010 Manual 
For Military Commissions (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/20100405-military-commissions.pdf (joint statement by hu-
man rights advocates calling on the U.S. Department of Defense for an opportuni-
ty for public comment on the new Military Commissions Manual). 
 66. See Eugene R. Fidell, Preface to 3 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 
MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK, at x (2009). 
 67. The Rulemaking Process, U.S. CTS.,  http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd 
Policies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) 
(providing background information on the federal rules and the rulemaking 
process). 
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transparency of multiple facets of the criminal justice system is es-
sential to generating confidence in the fairness of the process.68  It 
fosters, over time, a prevalent understanding that the American jus-
tice system, while not perfect, generally meets most fundamental due 
process standards required by international law.69  Conversely, the 
dearth of transparency in the military commissions has been a persis-
tent source of criticism and will continue to undermine the system’s 
credibility and the public’s confidence in the commissions’ results. 
IV.  LACK OF A PRINCIPLED DISTINCTION POINTS TO SECOND CLASS 
OF JUSTICE 
The military commissions’ credibility is further undermined by 
the continued lack of a coherent rationale for trying some cases in 
commissions and others in civilian courts.  In the nearly two years 
since the Obama Administration first announced its intention to con-
tinue with military commissions, it has struggled to articulate a prin-
cipled justification of its intention to pursue different sets of rules for 
two categories of Guantanamo Bay defendants slated for trial.  The 
lack of a principled distinction serves to highlight the commissions’ 
procedural shortcomings. 
At times, the Obama Administration has inferred that military 
commissions are the appropriate forum to try violations of the laws 
of war.70  Yet, the substantial overlap in the subject matter jurisdic-
tions of the military commissions and civilian courts undermines the 
assertion that it is the nature of the offense being tried in certain cas-
es that necessitates the use of military commissions.71  Article III 
  
 68. See Fidell, supra note 60, at 382. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees 
for Violations of the Law of War: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 
111th Cong. 46 (2009) [hereinafter Legal Issues] (statement of Retired Maj. Gen. 
John D. Altenburg, Jr., Former Appointing Authority for Military Commissions); 
Lindsey Graham, Guest Column: Time to Bring Terrorists to Trial, INDEP. MAIL 
(Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.independentmail.com/news/2010/sep/12/guest-
column-time-bring-terrorists-trial. 
 71. See Legal Issues, supra note 70, at 46 (discussing the overlap between war 
crimes and violations under Title 18). 
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courts have enjoyed clear jurisdiction to try violations of the laws of 
war since the passage of the War Crimes Act in 1996.72  In 2006, 
Congress reaffirmed this principle when it amended the Act in a 
manner that closely tracks the description of those crimes triable 
before military commissions.73  The definitions of crimes triable be-
fore military commissions also closely follow the language of pre-
existing crimes in the federal criminal code74 and, in many instances, 
incorporate federal criminal code definitions by reference to Title 
18.75   
Moreover, many scholars and a plurality of the Supreme Court 
have questioned whether certain crimes enumerated in the MCA of 
2009 even constitute war crimes under international humanitarian 
law.76  In the context of hearings focused on the then-proposed text 
of the MCA of 2009, Jeh Johnson, Department of Defense General 
Counsel, and David Kris, Assistant Attorney General and head of the 
National Security Division of the Department of Justice, submitted 
testimony to four congressional committees questioning the legality 
of trying material-support crimes before military commissions.77  
  
 72. See War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006). 
 73. Compare Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1), 
120 Stat. 2600, 2633–35 (2006) (amended 2009), with § 3, 120 Stat. at 2625–630 
(§ 950v). 
 74. Compare Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 
123 Stat. 2574, 2608 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §950t(7) (2006)), 
with 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006) (defining crime of taking hostages); § 1802, 123 
Stat. at 2610–11 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2006)), with 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B (defining crime of material support to terrorism); § 1802, 123 
Stat. at 2610 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24) (2006)) (defining 
crimes of terrorism), with 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (defining “federal crime of 
terrorism”). 
 75. § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2608, 2611 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 950t(11)(B), t(25)(B) (2006)).  These provisions incorporate by reference the 
definition of “severe mental pain or suffering” found in 10 U.S.C. § 2340(2) and 
the definition of “material support or resources” found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b), 
respectively.  Id. 
 76. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 603 (2006) (plurality opinion hold-
ing that the government failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that conspiracy 
was a recognized offense against the laws of war). 
 77. See Proposals for Reform of the Military Commissions System: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 18 (2009) [hereinafter Proposals for 
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Kris’s testimony asserted: “[O]ur experts believe that there is a sig-
nificant likelihood that appellate courts will ultimately conclude that 
material support for terrorism is not a traditional law of war offense, 
thereby threatening to reverse hard-won convictions and leading to 
questions about the system’s legitimacy.”78  
Academics have likewise questioned whether Congress has the 
constitutional authority to designate crimes such as material support 
for terrorism and conspiracy as triable by military commissions, par-
ticularly after the date that the defendant committed the accused 
conduct.79  That Congress has given Article III courts clear jurisdic-
tion to try war crimes, while simultaneously granting military com-
missions jurisdiction over domestic offenses that are not traditional 
violations of the laws of war,80 casts serious doubt on the contention 
that the nature of war crimes makes them inherently better suited for 
the military commissions.  
In addition to highlighting the “war crimes” nature of certain of-
fenses, the Obama Administration also pointed to the “military cha-
racter” of the target and victims of the alleged criminal act in justify-
ing decisions to bring certain cases in commissions instead of Article 
III courts.81  When explaining his decision to bring the case against 
  
Reform] (statement of Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def.); Prosecuting 
Terrorists; Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 125 (2009) [hereinafter Prosecuting Terrorists] (statement 
of David Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen.); Reforming the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 and Detainee Policy: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 111th 
Cong. 55, 61 (2009) (statements of Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. & 
David Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen.); Legal Issues, supra note 70, at 9, 12 (statements 
of Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. & David Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
 78. Prosecuting Terrorists, supra note 77, at 125. 
 79. Chad De Veaux, Rationalizing the Constitution: The Military Commissions 
Act and the Dubious Legacy of Ex Parte Quirin, 42 AKRON L. REV. 13, 83 (2009); 
Glazier, Still a Bad Idea, supra note 13, at 93. 
 80. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.  
 81. See President Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request for the Justice Depart-
ment’s Office of Justice Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (statement of U.S. Att’y Gen. Eric Holder), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_8167/is_20100316/ai_n52506632/pg_7/?tag=
content;col1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
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Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, an alleged conspirator in the bombing of 
the U.S.S. Cole, in the military commissions, Attorney General Eric 
Holder noted that “a military target was involved. The casualties 
were our brave sailors, military men.”82  Holder stopped short, how-
ever, of explaining why the involvement of a military target influ-
ences the decision regarding which forum is most appropriate.  The 
nature of the target of the alleged criminal conduct is clearly not a 
determinative factor, as the current and previous Administrations 
have prosecuted numerous cases involving crimes against military 
personnel and installations in Article III courts.83  Moreover, the fact 
that military objectives are generally considered to be legitimate tar-
gets in armed conflict84 means that, in certain cases, the fact that the 
target is military in nature may make it less likely that the conduct 
violated the laws of war even though the conduct may have violated 
U.S. criminal law and thereby be prosecutable in U.S. federal courts. 
The Administration’s established process for making forum deci-
sions sheds precious light on its ultimate justification for continued 
use of the commissions in certain cases.  On July 20, 2009, the Ad-
ministration Detention Policy Task Force issued a protocol govern-
ing the disposition of detainee cases at Guantanamo Bay that the 
Task Force had referred for possible prosecution.85  The protocol 
  
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, No. 1:07CR647, 2008 WL 5455388 (N.D. 
Ohio Dec. 31, 2008) (case charging conspiracy to provide material support to ter-
rorists under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A based on defendants’ extensive planning to harm 
U.S. service members in Iraq and Afghanistan); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 
F. Supp. 2d 362, 364 (D. Conn. 2009) (disclosing classified information regarding 
the movement of the Fifth Fleet Battle Group, which included the aircraft carrier, 
the U.S.S. Constellation); United States v. Siddiqui, No. 1:08-cr-00826-RMB-1 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008) (defendant accused of shooting U.S. Army officers); 
United States v. Shnewer, No. 1:07-cr-00459-RBK (D.N.J. June 5, 2007) (accus-
ing and ultimately convicting defendants for staging an attack against U.S. service 
members stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey); C.J. Hughes, Pakistani Scientist 
Found Guilty of Firing at American, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A21. 
 84. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
1), art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 85. DET. POLICY TASK FORCE, DETERMINATION OF GUANTANAMO CASES 
REFERRED FOR PROSECUTION (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/documents/taba-prel-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf; see also Memorandum from Deten-
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lays out the process through which the National Security Division of 
the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and, ultimately, 
the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
determine whether cases slated for prosecution should be brought in 
military commissions or in Article III courts.86  This protocol deter-
mines that, where feasible, cases will be prosecuted in Article III 
courts.87  It then outlines factors to be considered in forum-selection 
decisions.88  But the protocol is strikingly vague, declining to ex-
plain how the preference for Article III courts is to be executed and 
what weight the various factors have on making one forum more 
favorable than the other.  On its face, it does little to answer the 
question: What makes a case more appropriate for commissions?  
However, the protocol also includes the consideration of factors such 
as “evidentiary problems” and “the extent to which the forum . . . 
permit[s] a full presentation of the wrongful conduct allegedly com-
mitted by the accused . . . .”89 
In the July 2009 hearings on the MCA of 2006, members of 
Congress probed David Kris and Jeh Johnson about the forum-
decision criteria and voiced frustration at the lack of any principled 
distinction between cases belonging in one forum or the other.90  It 
is, of course, not uncommon to afford prosecutorial discretion for 
forum choices in criminal cases.91  But the absence of any principled 
explanation of why certain cases belong in military commissions 
begs the question as to why the creation of the military commissions 
  
tion Policy Task Force to the Attorney General & Secretary of Defense (July 20, 
2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/deten tion072009.pdf. 
 86. DET. POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 85. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Legal Issues, supra note 70, at 16–18. 
 91. See Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsider-
ing the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 721, 732 (2002) (discussing use of prosecutorial discretion in choos-
ing between state and federal forums); Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State, 46 ARK. L. REV. 985, 996–99 
(1994) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in forum selection for juvenile cases). 
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is necessary in the first place.92  If one concedes—as the civilian 
criminal justice system’s track record demonstrates—that many of 
the Guantanamo Bay cases can and should be appropriately handled 
by the civilian courts,93 why continue to pursue a new system that 
has encountered serious obstacles and attracted significant criticism 
because its crimes and procedures are of dubious legality under in-
ternational and constitutional law?  If cases involving war crimes, 
acts of terrorism, and alleged military targets are appropriately 
brought in Article III courts, then why is it necessary to continue to 
try to cobble together a new system out of whole cloth?   
In the absence of any principled justification for pursuing mili-
tary commissions in certain cases, it becomes difficult to argue that 
the commissions are anything other than a second-tier system of jus-
tice created and maintained primarily to make it easier to secure 
convictions by providing defendants with fewer rights.  The military 
commissions, as laid out in the MCA of 2009 and the Manual for 
Military Commissions of 2010, include several deviations from pro-
ceedings under the UCMJ and federal court proceedings that disad-
vantage the defendant.94  These deviations include permitting the 
admission of hearsay evidence and, in limited circumstances, invo-
luntary statements of the accused, both of which would be barred 
from Article III courts or courts-martial.95  While the MCA of 2009 
  
 92. See Deborah Pearlstein, Holder Speaks, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Nov. 13, 
2009, 5:48 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/11/holder-speaks.html (noting 
the lack of any articulated principled distinction between Al Nashiri (accused 
U.S.S. Cole bomber), slated for military commission, and the case against the 9/11 
defendants, who, Attorney General Holder announced would be tried in the South-
ern District of New York). 
 93. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
55–56 (2008) (discussing cases in federal courts brought under applicable U.S.C. 
statutes). 
 94. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40932, COMPARISON OF 
RIGHTS IN MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, 10–11 & 19–20 (2010) [hereinafter COMPARISON OF RIGHTS]; JENNIFER 
K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R. 41163, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT 
OF 2009: OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES, 25–27 (2010) [hereinafter OVERVIEW AND 
LEGAL ISSUES].  
 95. See COMPARISON OF RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 10–11 & 19–20; OVERVIEW 
AND LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 94, at 25–27. 
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is silent on the issue of derivative evidence, the Manual for Military 
Commissions explicitly interprets the law as allowing for the admis-
sion of evidence derived from statements obtained by torture, cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment, or other coercion if “use of such 
evidence would otherwise be consistent with the interests of jus-
tice.”96  If this rule is upheld, it would certainly permit the admission 
of evidence not permitted under federal court rules.  Such eviden-
tiary laxity has led some U.S. allies to refuse to provide key wit-
nesses and evidence for use in the military commissions.97 
Former military commission chief prosecutor Morris Davis cha-
racterized the problematic double legal standard created by the 
commissions’ laxer rules on evidence admissibility as follows:  
The evidence likely to clear the high bar gets gold medal jus-
tice: a traditional trial in our federal courts.  The evidence 
unable to clear the federal court standard is forced to settle 
for a military commission trial, a specially created forum that 
has faltered repeatedly for more than seven years.  That is a 
double standard I suspect we would condemn if it was ap-
plied to us.98 
Davis bemoaned that this double standard perpetuates the negative 
perception of the U.S. government’s commitment to the rule of law 
and the sense that that U.S. government continues to evade the 
rights-protecting standards of its own courts.99  
A few proponents state outright that they support the use of mili-
tary commissions because of, and not despite, the double standard 
that the commissions create.100  They assert that individual “terror-
ists” should be afforded fewer rights.101  Members of Congress who 
  
 96. MMC 2010, supra note 40, at III-9, R. 304(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
 97. Charlie Savage, Judge Delays Resumption of Guantánamo Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/15gitmo.html.  
 98. Morris Davis, Editorial, Justice and Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2009, at A21. 
  99. See id. 
100. See, e.g., Legal Issues, supra note 70, at 38–39 (statement of Sen. Joseph 
Lieberman arguing that the 9/11 defendants do not deserve the greater constitu-
tional protections of Article III courts because of the barbaric nature of the crimes 
they allegedly committed). 
101. Id.  
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take this position, such as Senator Joseph Lieberman, have offered 
legislation that would expand the reach of commissions by purport-
ing to revoke the citizenship of defendants suspected of acts of ter-
rorism,102 prohibiting the use of Article III courts for trials of desig-
nated “unlawful enemy combatants,” and prohibiting the reading of 
Miranda warnings to any such individuals.103 
Such proposals to create a second-tier set of evidentiary rules for 
criminal trials of certain categories of individuals threaten to under-
mine the process guaranteed by the criminal justice system.  For the 
government, it provides an avenue for circumventing the system’s 
evidentiary requirements.  Moreover, basing a determination of 
which set of rules a defendant is afforded on the nature of her or his 
alleged conduct is antithetical to the fundamental principle that a 
defendant is innocent until proven guilty.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the likelihood that military commissions will continue to 
be dogged by the same continuous growing pains, missteps, legal 
uncertainties, and lack of credibility that they have encountered since 
2001, the Obama Administration appears intent on continuing to 
pursue some category of cases in the system for the near term.  But 
the severe drawbacks of the commissions’ process should, at a min-
imum, prompt policymakers to examine more closely the viability of 
the commission system beyond select cases of detainees currently in 
U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay.  The very fact that the Administra-
tion advocated for the inclusion of a sunset clause or a similar dura-
tional limitation in the MCA of 2009,104 a recommendation that 
  
102. Garance Franke-Ruta, Legislative Proposal to Revoke Citizenship of Accused 
Terrorist Called Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, May 6, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/06/AR2010050 
605155.html. 
103. Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, S. 
3081, 111th Cong. § 3(b)(3) (2010). 
104. See Proposals for Reform, supra note 77, at 31 (statement of David Kris, 
Assistant Att’y Gen.); Prosecuting Terrorists, supra note 77, at 27 (statement of 
David Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen.). 
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Congress failed to heed, appears to indicate a lack of confidence in 
the viability of the commissions’ process over the long term.  
As the new cases are brought in the military commissions, and as 
the older cases move slowly through the appellate process, policy-
makers should keep a close eye on how the commissions proceed.  
Over time, the U.S. government and the American public may de-
termine that they expect more from this criminal process than a 
“learning experience”105 that does little to advance justice while con-
tinuing to erode confidence in U.S. adherence to the rule of law.  
 
  
105. Vandeveld & Dratel, supra note 43. 
